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PREFACE 
A content analysis of the coverage of the oil crises by three U.S. 
news magazines, Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report was 
designed to determine how well U.S. news magazines contributed to the 
understanding of a major public policy issue and served the public's 
need to know. An earlier study on television news coverage of the oil 
crises by The Media Institute in Washington, D.C., was a guide for the 
researcher of this work. The goal of this study was to determine the 
content of communication for accurately predicting the coverage by news 
magazines on a major public policy issue in the future. 
A random sample of articles about the oil crises of the seventies by 
Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World· Report were analyzed for 
differences and similarities that would specify aspects of media 
coverage that could be improved upon in the future. 
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all the people who 
assisted me in this work during my stay at Oklahoma State University and 
since that time. I was especially inspired by the dedication and 
constant support of my major advisor, Dr. William Steng. I am equally 
as indebted to committee member, Dr. Walter Ward, for his guidance and 
advisement during the course of this work. 
Most of all, I wish to dedicate this work to my father, Jack, a 
teacher, whose devotion to his profession inspired many to strive for 
excellence. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
President Reagan on January 28, 1981, speeded oil decontro 1 that 
allowed the post-crises era to commence. 11 With that simple act, the 
energy crisis of the 1970 1 S has ended. 111 
Americans are more aware in the eighties of the importance of energy 
and, in particular, of the supply of oil and the devastating conse-
quences of short supply. I nternat ion a 1 events that prompted the oi 1 
crises of the seventies, and provoked spontaneous hostile reactions from 
American citizens and foreign nations as well, also have created an 
awareness of the media•s role in reporting a major public policy issue. 
Events that actually were tactics by nations of the Middle East and 
Arab oil-producing states to gain control of the world oil market 
appeared to be overnight occurrences to most Americans. When oil prices 
quadrupled, most Americans were confused and bewildered about the U.S. 
energy situation. 
While Americans attempted to alter their lifestyles and become 
accustomed to long gas-lines, fuel shortages, and rationing, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel was 
strengthening its position in the international petroleum market. U.S. 
dependency on foreign oil allowed OPEC and other foreign oil-producing 
1 
2 
countries to demand higher oil prices. Though OPEC had increased the 
price of oil by 40% in March of 1979, oil prices still doubled by year-
end and the American public did not know why. 2 
The beginning of the oil crisis can be traced to 1968 at the start 
of the environmental movement. Few Americans were aware that the nation 
was operating under a program initiated by President Eisenhower in 
1959. The Oil Import Quota System placed limitations on the country•s 
imports that amounted to no more than 12% of its total consumption. The 
program was initiated on the basis of national security. Politicians 
were concerned that dependence on foreign oil would leave the United 
States vulnerable in times of national security. By 1973, the United 
States was importing 48% of its petroleum supply from the OPEC 
countries. In 1978, U.S. petroleum imports rose to 69%. 
This situation did not transpire overnight, but over a period of two 
decades. The short supply of petroleum in the United States debilitated 
by a lack of knowledge about simple economic principles and historical 
perspective could have been avoided. Instead, uninformed politicians, 
media, and consumers boosted the leverage of the OPEC cartel and other 
foreign oil-producers. Events leading to and following the first crisis 
have been labeled 11 the greatest and swiftest transfer of wealth in 
history. 113 This short treatise on the oil crises of the seventies is 
merely a preamble to these vital questions concerning the media•s role 
during those crises: 
How well did it outline the range of policy issues and 
contribute to a better understanding of the pub 1 i c po 1 i ~Y 
debate? and How well did it serve the public•s need to know? 
3 
The Purpose 
Media coverage of the oil crises contributed to the public 1 s 
understanding or misunderstanding of a major public policy issue. The 
magnitude of these crises was comparable perhaps only to Watergate or 
the Great Depression of the thirties. 
The press too often is guilty of 11 event orientation 11 which means 
reporting just the 11 event 11 and not the whole picture. The Great 
Depression is a good example of 11 event orientation. 11 
What the readers or viewers are really interested in are the 
implications of what takes place ••• orientation frequently 
leaves these implications unstated ••• Here we encounter some 
problems with this purely event orientation; it %ssumes that 
readers are interested in these events, as events. 
Like other 11 pseudo-events, 11 the oil crises had 11 neat, we 11 defined 
boundaries. 11 
The pseudo-event is the logical, albeit sometimes absurd, 
outcome of the intensive event orientation of the press ••• 
there is a real question of whether all these bits and pieces, 
no matter how skillfully handled, ever come together to form 
the full mosaic of our contemporary history. The press is 
quite adept at handling major misfortunes such as 
assassinations of political leaders, outbreaks of war, and 
economic catastrophes. The press can respond rapidly to such 
events, more6 rapidly than most public or quasi-public institutions. 
Events supposedly have clear beginnings and endings, but often do not 
appear that way over time. The cause of this phenomenon is the method 
of reporting used: 
••• when it comes to reporting the broad secular sweep of 
history, then the press often lags significantly behind other 
public institutions. It is not in the press that one often 
enough learns of deeply embedded social problems, significant 
social r7alignments, and proposed solutions to the problems of 
the day. 
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Examination of the studies of the relationship of the oil crises and 
the media revea 1 ed the instantaneous impact of te 1 ev is ion warranted 
analysis. Polls indicate most people report receiving most of their 
news information from television rather than newspapers or news 
magazines. Lack of examination of the latter spurred this study. The 
purpose was two-fold: (1) to contribute to an understanding of a major 
public policy issue; (2} and to identify specific areas in which the 
qua 1 i ty of coverage might be improved. A comparison of the news 
magazines from one crisis to the next indicates the changes that have 
occurred in the selection of subjects by each news magazine. 
The two-fold purpose was realized by analyzing the content of the 
oil crises by three weekly news magazines: Newsweek, Time, and U.S. 
News & World Report. McCombs, Shaw, and Grey exp 1 a in that content 
analysis 
is an observation technique designed to take a sample of 
language (or paintings or music) and analyze that language for 
the message it carries. The goal is to be able to infer from 
objective, hard evidence what the sender of the message really 
means o3 to obtain some idea of the effect the sender 
intends. 
The Objectives 
The focus of this study was similar to that done by the Media 
Institute in Washington, D.C. on television coverage of the oil 
crises. It did not deal with the oil crises themselves, but with how 
the oil crises were covered by Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report. Also, similar to the Institute•s study, the perceptions of the 
audience were not addressed in this study. 
11 Subjects 11 and sources were vital to television coverage and also to 
this work. These were deemed synonymous as in the above-mentioned 
5 
study. Summarily, the objectives, to fulfill the purpose of this study, 
were to determine: 
(a)If similar 11 SUbjects 11 were used in the coverage of the oil 
crises by Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report? 
(b)If similar sources were used in Newsweek 1 s, Time 1 s, and 
U.S. News & World Report 1 s coverage of the oil crises? 
(c)If the selection of subjects and sources by Newsweek, 
Time, and U.S. News and World Report, changed from the first 
oil crisis to the second oil crisis? 
Statement of Problem 
The prob 1 em can be stated: 11 Were there significant differences 
among Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report in their coverage of 
the oil crises? 11 Through ex post facto study and content analysis, 11 a 
research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative 
description of the manifest content of communication, 119 this study 
examined the coverage of the oil crises by Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News 
& World Report. 
ENDNOTES 
1 The Media Institute, TV Coverage of the Oil Crises: How Well Was 
the Public Served? (Washington, D.C.: The Media Institute, 1982), III, 
p. 31. 
2 The Media Institute, I, p. vi. 
3 Wi 11 i am Tucker, 11 The Energy Crisis is Over, 11 Harper 1 s, November 
1981, p. 33. 
4 The Media Institute, I, p. vi. 
5 Maxwell McCombs, Donald Lewis Shaw, and Davis Grey, Handbook of 
Reporting Methods (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), p. 4. 
6 McCombs, Shaw, and Grey, p. 4-5. 
7 McCombs, Shaw, and Grey, p. 5. 
8 McCombs, Shaw, and Grey, p. 141. 
9 Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (New 
York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971), p. 18. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Within less than a week of his inauguration, President Ronald Reagan 
dissolved price controls that had governed American oil for almost 10 
years. Unlike other proclamations, which usually are accompanied by 
pomp and circumstance, this one was uneventful. At the onset, the 
hoopla surrounding long gas lines, rationing, and higher oil prices, 
received major media play. At the resolve, media coverage was minimal. 
An i nat tent i ve American pub 1 i c was preoccupied with the current 
panacea and measures that would combat further dependence on foreign 
oil-producers like OPEC. By 1981, it was evident that oil prices and 
the leverage of OPEC were declining. 11 Before very long, these events 
started to have repercussions on the world market. By early summer, 
every major OPEC nation found itself with growing stockpiles. 111 
What led to these events was unforeseeable and obscure to the 
American layman. Regardless, the American public should have been more 
informed. Perspective on any major public policy issue is given through 
day-to-day coverage by the media. In this instance, it is apparent to 
some that the media failed to provide that information. 
Researchers of the Media Institute were aware of the media 1 s failure 
in coverage of the oil crises and, thus, analyzed the content of evening 
news broadcasts of ABC, CBS, and NBC. However, there is no indication 
7 
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that further examination has been attempted by others. The researcher's 
own investigation did not reveal additional research relevant to this 
study. Little has been done on the impact of the media or on public 
awareness of the oil crises. Lack of examination by researchers on this 
major public policy issue suggested the need for this study and others 
to follow. 
Historical and Economic Perspective 
Two journalism professors have studied the problem of constructing 
an historical standard to compare the performance of weekly news 
magazines in reporting_ events. L. John Martin, a professor at the 
University of Maryland, and Harold L. Nelson, professor emeritus at the 
University of Wisconsin, 
••• are concerned that the traditional methods of history do 
not produce an historical stan~rd that is objective in the 
sense that it can be duplicated. 
Historical perspective, according to the Media Institute's study, is 
essential for examining clearly the relationship between international 
and domestic crude oil production and U. S. government policies. Energy 
experts and economists seemed to be the only ones who could explain that 
the artificially low price of domestic oil induced by the freeze of 1971 
encouraged consumers to buy more rather than to conserve. 
Our economic illiteracy rate is alarmingly high ••• When we 
examine the more special challenges of communication in 
economics and suggest that these challenges should be met, let 
us admit in a~vance that meeting them would be no small 
accomplishment. 
Berelson, on establishing an historical standard, says 
• • • press performance may be eva 1 uated in the 1 i ght of an 
outside non-content standard. The content of the medium, that 
is, may be checked against the content of what actually 
happened • • • the standard must be accept~d before there can 
be confidence in evaluation of performance. 
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The Media Institute noted that many subjects that dealt with economic 
aspects of the uil crises were not treated as causes or solutions. 
It is revealing that the networks treated the economic 
components of the crises as i nci denta 1 to the ~a 1 uti ens and 
causes, rather than as the very essence of both. 
The economic perspective or the universally accepted law of supply 
and demand vital to regulation and allocation of our scarce resources 
was relied on less than 2% of the time in television coverage. 
The most elemental concept in an introductory economics course 
has escaped many of our brightest and best informed cit~zens 
and it was undoubtedly a difficult subject to popularize. 
Popular or not, the message never got to people. 11 Few seemed to 
recognize that price has a profound influence on demand and supply. 117 
Had the public realized that ending price controls would resolve the oil 
crises in the United States, they may or may not have heeded economists' 
warnings. But as the eighties progressed, evidence clearly mounted in 
favor of basic economic understanding. Methods for controlling 
conservation, had they been initiated, may have ended the continual rise 
in oil prices. Economic principles, at least, have proven effective in 
the eighties. 
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Solutions to the Oil Crises 
A variety of solutions to the oil crises were addressed by U.S. news 
magazines, Newsweek, Time, U.S. News & World Report. Among those 
solutions covered were non-market issues such as conservation, 
rationing, regulation, and price controls. There was no casual link 
between the political economy of the oil crises and the coverage that 
non-market solutions received during 1973-74 and 1978-79. 
An over-re 1 i ance on government sources for information may have 
resulted in the coverage that non-market solutions received. A lack of 
interest in the expertise of economists for the preference of government 
sources created a perspective void of economic and historical dimensions 
necessary for presenting a comprehensive picture of a major public 
policy issue. 
Allowing the free market to regulate the price of oil in the 
eighties has proven that market solutions were the most viable of all 
solutions proposed during the oil crises of the seventies. 
Causes of the Crises 
11 Is the crisis real? 11 Many Americans grappled with this question 
while pondering the alternative to a real crisis which meant 
manipulation by 11 8ig Oil. 11 II seven in ten Americans thought the 
gasoline shortages were deliberately contrived by oil companies ••• 118 
Perhaps the complexity of the crises seemed too great for even the most 
experienced reporters. Possibly the medium to disseminate information 
was incorrect for in-depth research necessary for efficient and accurate 
reporting in the time or space allotted. 
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Whatever the reason, motives behind and blame for the oil crises 
were placed on the oil companies and popularized by the news media. The 
Media Institute's study revealed that " ••• 35% of the discussion on 
the origins of the crises dwelled on the oil industry as the prime 
perpetrator."9 
OPEC, too, became a target for angry consumers and businessmen. In 
essence, the cartel was blessed by absolute timing. Despite confused 
media and popular opinion, OPEC had not devised a scheme to curtail 
competition in the world oil market. OPEC simply reacted to "an 
inevitable social process." 10 In March 1973, President Nixon reenacted 
price controls on petroleum products though a domestic crude oil 
shortage existed prior to the Arab oil embargo. 
Government Involvement 
"Since at least the 1930s," writes Professor Clayburn LaForce, "the 
United States petroleum market has been manipulated for political 
purposes." 11 President Reagan's move to decontrol the price of oil 
revealed astonishing results. By allowing the price to rise, gasoline 
lines were eliminated, entitlements were abolished and U.S. dependence 
on oil somewhat alleviated. 
A complimentary effect of crude oil price decontrol has been a 
rise in domestic energy production. U.S. oil exploration was 
the boom industry of the early 1980s, registering a 30% 
increase 1 ~n 1980 and an additional 28% rise in the first half 
of 1981. 
Throughout the oil crises, government involvement received little media 
attention. At the end, evidence implicated federal energy policies as 
debilitating vulnerability to foreign sources. 
The government truly enjoyed total immunity in the energy 
crises. It could devote full resources to creating fuel 
shortages, and in plain view of the national press corps it 
could boast of such efforts while simultaneously being 
characterized as the solution to the crises ••• while Senate 
panels convened in the 1973-74 crises to discuss whether the 
gas shortages were 11 real, 11 the Federal Energy Office could 
have supplied a ready answer. The FED knew the gas shortages 
were real becau13 they were enforcing rules purposely designed 
to create them. 
Effects of the Oil Crises 
12 
Though the oil crises of the seventies were a major event, the 
effects of the oil crises were the accretion of smaller events affecting 
the ordinary American citizen, government, the oil industry, and many 
other industries such as tourism, auto, trucking, and airline. Media 
coverage, unlike other aspects of the oil crises, cited the consumer 
point of view when discussing these effects, rather than the 
government 1 s. The dilemma the crises caused for this variety of people 
and industries resulted in the diverse coverage it received. 
Media Accountability and the Gatekeeping Function 
Media responsibility and ethics have been a controversial issue for 
many years, and while the Media Institute 1 s study attempts to place no 
blame on any one individual or organization, it does note that the media 
failed to cover the oil crises adequately~ 
It should become habitual editorial policy to play fairly and 
clearly the opinions, analyses, and situations offered by a 
wide variety of peop 1 e, expert, and nonexpert, covering t~e 
spectrum regardless of the proprietor 1 s personal positions. 
In-depth coverage necessary for adequately reporting a major public 
policy issue such as the oil crises may not have been ideally suited for 
the television medium, however, the media must remain accountable to the 
13 
public ••• 11 because the media function as an information gatekeeper, 
selecting from the vast assortment of ideas and opinions those few that 
will enjoy exposure.u15 
The phenomenon known as 11 gatekeeping 11 is not new. It was advanced 
by a social scientist, Dr. Kurt Lewin. Lewin explained the process this 
way: 
••• gate sections are governed either by impartial rules or 
by 11 gatekeepers, 11 and in the latter case an individual or 
group l:i.s 11 in power 11 for making the decision between 11 in 11 or 
11 0Ut.11 0 
In any event, nothing is more important than the 11 gatekeeping 11 
function. Wilbur Schramm remarks that, 
• • • no aspect of communication is so impressive as the 
enormous number of choices and discards which have to be made 
between the formation of the symbol in the mind of the 
communi cater, and thi.7 appearance of a re 1 a ted symbo 1 in the 
mind of the receiver. 
Studies 
The oil crises of the seventies left Americans with many unanswered 
questions. Among those questions were those posed by The Media 
Institute, a non-profit, tax-exempt research organization founded to 
research and analyze major public policy issues. 
In 1982, The Media Institute published a three-volume study of 
network news coverage of the oi 1-cri ses. As the Institute•s study 
stated: 
• the oil crises of 1973-74 and 1978-79 shocked Americans 
economically and psychologically more than anr non-military 
event since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Apparent to researchers of The Media Institute were these unanswered 
questions: 
How well did television teach and illuminate for its viewers 
the causes, effects, and possible solutions to this major 
story which saw world oil prices jump eighteen-fold from less 
than $2 to about $35 a barrel in six years? How well did it 
outline the range of public policy issues and contribute to a 
better understanding of the public pol~cy debate? How well 
did it serve the public•s need to know? 
14 
ENDNOTES 
1 Willi am Tucker, 11 The Energy Crisis is Over ,11 Harper • s, November 
1981, p. 16. 
2 L. John Martin and Harold L. Nelson, 11 The Historical Standard in 
Analyzing Press Performance, 11 Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 33 (Winter, 
1956), p. 457. 
3 Bernard Kilgore, 11 The Challenge of Communication in Economics, 11 
Journalism Quarterly, Supplement, p. 432. 
4 Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (New 
York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971), p. 46. 
5 The Media Institute, TV Coverage of the Oil Crises: How Well Was 
the Public Served? (Washington, D.C.: The Media Institute, 1982), I, 
p. 55. 
6 The Media Institute, I, p. vii. 
7 The Media Institute, I, p. vii. 
8 The Media Institute, I I I, p. 20. 
9 The Media Institute, I I I, p. XXIV. 
10 The Media Institute, I II, p. XIII. 
11 The Media Institute, III, p. XI. 
12 The Media Institute, III, p. 33. 
13 The Media Institute, I II, p. 23. 
14 Donald McDonald, 11 The Media•s Conflict of Interests, 11 The Center 
Magazine, November/December 1976, p. 25. 
15 The Media Institute, I, p. 2. 
16 David Manning White, . 11 The Gatekeeper: A Case Study of the 
Selection of News, 11 Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 27 (Winter, 1950), p. 
383. 
17 Wilbur Schramm, Mass Communications, (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1949), p. 289. 
15 
18 The Media Institute, p. v. 
19 The Media Institute, p. vi. 
16 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Selection and Samples of News Magazines 
Data for analysis in this study were drawn from articles listed 
under the heading 11 Petroleum Supply 11 in the Reference Guide to 
Periodicals. Issues were selected only from the time periods designated 
as either the first or second oil crises. News magazines chosen for 
analysis were Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report. 
It has been determined by Berelson that 
For most purposes, analysis of a small, carefully chosen 
sample of the relevant content will produce juit as valid 
results as the analysis of a great deal more ••• 
However, Kerlinger 1 s remarks to the beginning researcher are somewhat 
different. 
Use as large samp 1 es as pass i b 1 e. Large numbers are not 
advocated because large numbers are good in and of themselves. 
They are advocated in order to give the principle of 
randomization, or simply randomness, a chance to work ••• 2 
In content analysis, or any other type of analysis for that matter, 
random sampling is 11 one of the most important principles in sampling 
theory and practice. 113 And for this reason, random sampling was used in 
this study as the most viable method for sampling media coverage of the 
oil crises in Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report. 
17 
Nowhere in social science research does one escape the 
necessity for having a sound sampling sc~Jrme. Such a plan is 
especially important in content analysis. 
Criteria for Selection of Articles 
18 
Issues of the news magazines Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report, were drawn at random from each of the time periods determined to 
be the first and second oil crises. The third week of each month of the 
first and then the second oil crises was selected randomly to represent 
the coverage of the oil crises. The first crisis was comprised of 24 
weeks and the second crisis of 32 weeks. In each case, however, the 
third week of each month beginning with the first month of each crisis 
(October for the first crisis and November for the second crisis) was 
selected to represent each distinct period. Those weeks that did not 
contain coverage during the designated time periods were eliminated and 
the next week automatically moved up in the selection process. For this 
study, this sampling procedure produced for examination 9 weeks/36 
articles during the first crisis and 8 weeks/24 articles during the 
second crisis. Table I, page 19, and Table II, page 20, show the random 
assignment of articles from Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report, used in this study. 
Weeks Selected 
for Sample 
November 12 
November 26 
December 10 
December 31 
January 21 
March 18 
April 22 
Mat 20 
TOTALS 8 WEEKS 
TABLE I 
RANDOM SAMPLE OF ARTICLES SELECTED FROM 
THREE U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES DURING 
FIRST OIL CRISIS CODED FOR 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Number of Number of 
Newsweek Time 
Articles Articles 
( 2) ( 2) 
( 3) ( 4) 
( 0) ( 4) 
( 0) ( 0) 
( 3) ( 2) 
( 0) ( 0) 
( 0) ( 2) 
(_Q) ( 0) 
8 14 
19 
Number of 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
Articles 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 0) 
( 6) 
( 0) 
( 2) 
( 0) 
( 1) 
14 
Weeks Selected 
for sample 
January 1 
January 22 
February 19 
March 12 
April 2 
April 23 
June 4 
July 2 
July 23 
TOTALS 9 WEEKS 
TABLE II 
RANDOM SAMPLE OF ARTICLES SELECTED FROM 
THREE U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES DURING 
SECOND OIL CRISIS CODED FOR 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Number of Number of 
Newsweek Time 
Articles Articles 
( 1) ( 1) 
( 0) ( 0) 
( 3) ( 0) 
( 1) ( 3) 
( 0) ( 1) 
( 0) ( 1) 
( 2) ( 0) 
( 2) ( 4) 
( 0) (_JJ 
9 11 
20 
Number of 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
Articles 
( 0) 
( 1) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 0) 
( 3) 
4 
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Content Analysis 
Content is the 11 What 11 of the 11 Who says what to whom, how, with what 
effect 11 in the communication process • 
• since the content represents the means through which one 
person or group communicates with another, it is important for 
communication . research 5o be described with accuracy and 
interpreted with insight. 
To achieve these goals, content analysis is employed as the most 
scientific method for examining differences between Newsweek, Time, and 
U.S. News & World Report, in the coverage of the oil crises of the 
seventies. Kerlinger describes content analysis this way: 
It is • • • a method of observation. Instead of observing 
people's behavior directly, or asking them to respond to 
scales, or interviewing them, the investigator takes the 
communications that6people have produced and asks questions of 
the communications. 
The primary focus of content analysis is the content of communication. 
Its relationships to other variables are imperative and yield a 
necessary prerequisite--understanding communication behavior. 11 The 
ultimate goal of the investigator in the behavioral sciences is to 
predict behavior. 117 Determining differences and similarities in the 
coverage of the oil crises among Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report by using content analysis should aid in the accurate prediction 
of future reporting, investigating, and possible understanding of a 
major public policy issue such as the oil crises of the seventies. 
Categorical Variables 
Categorical variables are nominal variables. A nominal variable is 
one that has no numerical value, but possesses attributes that can be 
assigned to categories and measured. To name something is nominal. If 
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it can be named, it can be put into a category, then measured. The 
level of measurement is called nominal. 
In this study, categorical variables were 11 subjects 11 and 
11 sources. 11 Data selected from a random sample of articles of U.S. news 
magazines, Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report, were assigned 
to categories and measured. 
Categories and the Coding Process 
To determine differences and similarities of coverage of the oil 
crises by Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report, categories from 
the Media Institute's Study were used to determine an article relevant 
to this study. As reported on page 17, articles were selected from 
under the heading 11 Petroleum Supply'' in the Reference Guide to 
Periodicals and only from Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report, 
during 1973-1974 and 1978-1979. An attempt was made to select articles 
from under the heading 11 Energy Crisis.'' However, a reference was made to 
11 Petroleum Supply. 11 The terms 11 energy crisis 11 and 11 petroleum supply 11 
were too broad for the purpose of this study, so criteria for selection 
of news articles were constructed. The same categories that identified 
oil crises stories in the Media Institute's study of television coverage 
of the oil crises were used in this study. 
Because a single story might cover several different subjects 
or present several opposing views on the subject, this study 
was designed to accommodate such complexity and variety. For 
the purpose of this study, a 11 subject 11 was defined as an issue 
or point of view raised in the oil crises stories, sue~ as 
oil-crises-induced unemployment or lowered highway speeds. 
For each subject(s) raised in 
viewpoints), the source ( s) was noted. 
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a story (includes opposing 
These subjects then cou 1 d be 
classified as solutions to or causes of the oil crises. 
11 Solutions to 11 the oil crises were either market or non-market 
solutions. Non-market solutions discussed and analyzed were either 
conservation, rationing, regulation or price controls. 
Conservation included these subjects: called for/needed/advanced as 
solution; conservation measures as effective/ successful; conservation 
measures as ineffective/unsuccessful; lowered thermostat settings; 
lowered highway speeds; White House symbolic conservation measures; 
reduced electric lighting; daylight savings time; car pooling; airline 
flight reductions; other measures discussed (fuel efficient cars, 
closing schools in winter) (excluding price induced conservation). 
Rationing was comprised of the subjects: overall portrayal as 
desirable/advanced as a solution; overall portrayal as undesirable; 
rationing is probable; rationing is unlikely to occur; rationing, other. 
Regulation, a category the Media Institute added during the second 
crises included: regulation; price controls. 
Market solutions covered in the articles about the oil crises were 
deregulation; decontrol; taxes; price mechanism; domestic production. 
The category 11 causes of 11 included: oil industry, government, OPEC, 
and other. The oil-industry referred to: oil-industry blamed 
(general); holding back suppli,es/tankers offshore; excessive profits; 
price gouging; hoax; conspiracy. 
Government referred to: allocation system blamed; regulation; price 
controls; government blamed (general); and denial that government should 
be blamed. 
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Sources discussed in the oil crises stories were distinguished as a 
separate category. Sources identified were 1) government: federal; 
Congress; and state and local; and 2) non-government which included: 
the oil-industry (excluding service station operators); non-oil 
industry/business; OPEC; 11man-in-the-street 11 ; labor (auto, teamsters, 
miners); 11 experts 11 (financial analysts, economists, energy experts); 
other (consumer groups, GALLUP, AP~ academic institutions); service 
station operators; and unidentifiable (unattributed sources). 
The same index used to identify oil crises stories in the Media 
Institute's study also excluded the following categories and was used in 
this study. 
(1) Alternate Fuels - only stories pertaining to crude oil and 
refined products, e.g., gasoline, heating oil, aviation fuel, 
and kerosene were included. Thus, stories concerning oil 
shales, synfuels, natural gas, coal, solar, geo-thermal, and 
nuclear energy were excluded. 
(2) Foreign events only indirectly related to the oil crises in the 
United States. Thus, stories about the Arab-Israeli War, the 
Iranian Revolution, and the energy crises in foreign countries 
were excluded, unless they referred to the production of 
petroleum for export to the United States. If a story 
mentioned oil production in the context of a longer story about 
other matters, as in a story about the Iranian Revolution that 
makes mention of cutbacks in production, then only that portion 
of the story making a direct reference to oil was included. 
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(3) Bureaucratic Shuffle - stories noting, for example, that the 
Federal Energy Administration had had a change of command were 
excluded, unless some substantive policy matters were discussed 
in the story. 
Hypotheses 
"Scientific research is systematic, controlled, empirical, and 
critical investigation of hypothetical propositions about the presumed 
relations among natural phenomena."8 
So that this study could be conducted in a scientific manner, the 
research question was: "Were there significant differences in the 
coverage the of oil crises by Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report, during the periods October 1973 to May 1974 and November 1978 to 
August 1979?" 
Danielson observed that the trend in content analysis is toward 
hypothesis testing as opposed to purely descriptive research. To be 
more specific, the following hypotheses were stated as a result of the 
research question: 
(1) U.S. news magazines, Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report, presented a biased picture of solutions to the oil 
crises by relying more on non-market solutions (conservation, 
rationing, regulation, and price controls) than on market 
solutions (deregulation, decontrol, the price mechanism, and 
domestic production) as the most viable of solutions. 
(2) U.S. news magazines, Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report, were biased in their selection of government sources 
over non-government sources when covering pass i b 1 e so 1 uti ons 
to and causes of the oil crises. 
(3) U.S. news magazines, Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report, distorted the coverage that causes of the oil crises 
received by imp 1 i cat i ng OPEC and the oil industry instead of 
the U.S. government as prime perpetrators of the crises. 
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The hypotheses derive from the nature of the problem and in a sense 
help to refine it. In this study, subjects and sources were categorized 
and then translated into concrete, specific indicators for purposes of 
actual analysis. The results were then generalized and applied to the 
level of the categories and, thus, constituted a test of the hypotheses 
under investigation. 
Constraints 
Hypotheses are if-then statements. To construct a design that has 
empirical validity, it is necessary to 11 Control the independent 
variables so the extraneous and unwanted sources of systematic variance 
have minimal opportunity to operate. ull The confidence level of the 
results is related directly to these controls. 11 The whole structure of 
probabilistic-statistical reasoning depends on randomization. 1112 Both 
control and randomization are a function of internal validity. 
Equally as important to a research design is the generalizability of 
the conclusions. In other words, can the results of this study be 
generalized to other subjects, other groups and other conditions? 
Generalizability is a function of external validity. 
Aspects of 11 true 11 experiments are not possible in ex post facto 
research. Unlike the experimental researcher, the ex post facto 
researcher attempts to explain phenomenon that already has occurred. 
Direct control in ex post facto research is not possible. The 
researcher cannot use manipulation and randomization. Contra l, the 
basic difference in experimental and ex post facto research, thus, 
results in a course of action to be taken by the ex post facto 
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researcher that is significantly different from that of the experimental 
scientist. 
Because of the constraints in ex post facto research, interpreting 
the conclusions becomes risky. It is easy to 11 fit the facts 11 to the 
results of the study when the research is guided by hypotheses. 
However, an ex post facto design that does not test hypotheses is 
scientifically insignificant. 
Testing of Hypotheses 
11 In ex post facto research, one cannot manipulate or assign subjects 
or treatments because the independent variables already have 
occurred. ulO The fo 11 owing research design was chosen to answer the 
research questions and to adequately test the hypotheses. 
The Chi Square Test 
11 The function of statistical tests is to compare obtained results 
with those to be expected on the basis of chance. 1113 The chi-square 
test, written x2, was used in this study because it is one of the 
simplest and yet most useful of statistical tests, according to 
Kerlinger. In scientific research, the scientist wants to know if the 
obtained results differed significantly from those expected. Results 
that are considered 11 Statistically significant 11 warrant further analysis 
s i nee they do not occur by chance a 1 one. The x2 then measures the 
deviation of obtained results compared with those expected by chance. 
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Crossbreaks 
"A crossbreak is a numerical tabular presentation of data, usually 
in frequency or percentage form, in which variables are cross-
partitioned in order to study the relations between them." Crossbreaks 
are cross partitions used with categorical or nominal data. 
Crossbreaks, in this study, represent the relationship of U.S news 
magazines and the content of articles selected for analysis. The 
attributes or characteristics of the content of the articles were 
structured by the U.S. news magazines. The distribution of the data is 
shown in percentage form in crossbreaks in Appendix B. Calculations 
down the columns are shown in the upper left of each cell. Calculations 
over the whole table are shown in the lower right of each cell. 
Calculations from the independent to the dependent variable are in 
parentheses. 
Frequency Analysis 
The simplest form of analysis of categorical variables is frequency 
analysis. Frequencies are the number of objects in a set or universe. 
To measure an attribute of the members of the set or universe, objects 
with the same value or characteristic are counted and set up in an 
analytical paradign. The paradigm bears directly on the hypothesis, the 
stated problem, or the relationship of the independent and dependent 
variables. In this study, the paradigms represent the relationship of 
U.S. news magazines and subjects and sources chosen from the universe 
for analyses. 
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The content of articles randomly selected from U.S news magazines, 
Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report, is the universe of 
discourse of the set of dependent variable measures. U.S. news 
magazines are the independent variables and their categories structure 
the dependent variables, subjects and sources, for analysis. It is the 
dependent variable measures that are analyzed and it is the independent 
variables and their categories that partition or structure the dependent 
variables for analysis. 
Categories are set up according to the research hypotheses; 
they are independent and mutually exclusive; they are mutually 
exhaustive; each category is derived from one and only one 
c~assificat!on principle; all categories are on one level of 
d1scourse. 
If the relationships between frequencies of categories did not occur by 
chance alone, then the 11 no difference assumption 11 or null hypothesis was 
rejected and conclusions were drawn in support of the level of 
statistical significance. 
Magnitude of Relationship 
The next step after testing the subjects and sources selected by 
Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report, for articles about the oil 
crises with the x2 test, was to determine the magnitude of the 
relationship or the strength of difference, if differences occurred, 
with the C coefficient of contingency. The C coefficient is an index of 
the strength of the relationship and a measure of association between 
the U.S. news magazines, Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report, 
and subjects and sources selected for inclusion in articles about the 
oil crises during the seventies. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results of this study are based on the scientific testing of the 
articles randomly selected from three U.S. news magazines, Newsweek, 
Time, and U.S. News & World Report. By using content analysis, the 
content of these articles was organized into specific categories and 
analyzed to determine support or nonsupport of the hypotheses. The data 
analyzed by the x2 test revealed the following results: 
Subjects - Solutions to the Oil Crises 
Analysis did not support the hypothesis that U.S. news magazines 
biased the coverage of solutions by selecting nonmarket solutions more 
often than market solutions during the first or the second oil crises. 
Subjects - Causes of the Oil Crises 
Results indicated no significant difference among Newsweek, Time, 
and U.S. News & World Report, when reporting on this subject during 
either crises. Analysis did not support the hypothesis that the oil 
industry and OPEC were blamed more often than government as a cause of 
the oil crises and, thus, did not support the hypothesis that the 
coverage was biased by the selection of subjects for causes to the oil 
crises. 
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Sources of Information 
The results of analysis showed no signficant difference among 
Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report, when reporting on sources 
or subjects reported during either the first or second oil crises. 
Thus, there was no evidence to support that government sources were 
relied on more often than non-government sources during the first or 
second oil crises. 
Differences/Similarities from the First to the Second Oil Crises 
Results of scientific testing to determine if significant 
differences occurred from the first oil crisis to the second oil crisis 
revealed the following conclusions. 
Subjects - Solutions to the Oil Crises 
Analysis of solutions from the first to the second oil crises 
revealed that observed differences did not exceed the level of 
statistical significance. 
Subjects - Causes of the Oil Crises 
Analysis of causes from the first to the second oil crises showed 
observed differences did not exceed the chance or expected value at 
either the .01 or .05 level of statistical significance. 
Sources of Information 
Analysis of sources of information from the first oil crisis to the 
second oil crisis showed that the sources used by U.S. News & World 
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Report, Time, and Newsweek, did not exceed the chance or expected level 
of significance. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to determine how well Newsweek, Time, 
and U.S. News & World Report, illuminated for their readers the causes 
of and solutions to a major event which saw world oil prices jump 
eighteen-fold from less than $2 to about $35 a barrel in six years. 
Also proposed was how well these three U.S. news magazines outlined the 
range of policy issues and contributed to a better understanding of the 
public policy debate and served the public 1 s need to know. The results 
of this study did not support the contention that the coverage of 
subjects and sources of information presented in articles about the oil 
crises of the seventies were biased. 
This study attempted to present a picture of what three U.S. news 
magazines told Americans about the oil crises of the seventies. There 
was no attempt to document the actua 1 events that canst ituted the oil 
crises or the relative merits of the different explanations that 
appeared in Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report. 
When the history books are written, however, it now seems 
1 ike ly they wi 11 describe the 1980s as a peri ad of major 
adaptation, a time when oi 1 and other cheap energy sources 
ceased to be regarded as social entitlements and as 
commodities somehow immune from the laws of economics. 1 
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Conclusions 
The two oil crises of the past decade (1973-74) and (1978-79) were 
given considerable coverage by Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World 
Report. The researcher of this study found that these three U.S. news 
magazines portrayed the oil crises of the seventies in the following 
way: 
Subjects - Solutions to the Oil Crises 
The role of market solutions (deregulation, decontrol) vs. non-
market solutions (conservation, rationing, regulation, and price 
controls) received similar coverage by these three U.S. news magazines 
even though economists contended that there would have been no oil 
shortage and no gas lines had the price of oil been permitted to reflect 
its relative scarcity rather than being kept artificially low. Market 
solutions proven effective in the eighties, at least in the petroleum 
market, also necessitated conservation measures that were considered 
obvious solutions in the coverage of the oil crises. Still, no one 
solution dominated the coverage. 
Being an economic problem, the shortage of housing, or energy, 
or any other commodity, involves specifically a failure of 
communication: While consumers would be willing to pay more 
for a given resource, say energy, the providers of such are 
not permitted to hear this <tzmand, due to the transmission 
trouble called price controls. 
Price controls caused American imports to increase by 37% between 1971-
73. The result was dependency on foreign oil-producers such as OPEC. 
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Subjects - Causes of the Oil Crises 
Causes of the oil crises were government, oil industry, OPEC, and 
other. No one cause was cited more than any other when addressed by 
Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report. Imposed at a time when 
the United States was in fact running out of 11 Cheap oil," price controls 
initiated a ten-year decline in U.S. oil drilling and production by 
freezing prices such that oil production became less profitable. This 
was not decided by OPEC or contrived by the oi 1 industry, but by an 
inevitable social process. Causes of the oil crises since the seventies 
have proven to be po 1 icy induced. Prior to the seventies, federal 
policy encouraged consumption with lower oil prices which also increased 
the profitability of oil drilling. As the supply of oil increased and 
additional capital was invested, crude reserves were depleted because of 
import quotas. Price control policy imposed by President Nixon in March 
1973 resulted in gasoline shortages at the pumps the following 
October. This historical perspective was elementary in understanding 
the cause of events that affected every American citizen. 
The lessons of the first 1973 gas shortage were manifest: 
OPEC was not the root cause, binding price fontrols mean 
shortages are plugged by the foreign oil market. 
Sources of Information 
Sources were aggregated according to affiliation (e.g. government or 
non-government) and were relied on similarly by Newsweek, Time, and U.S. 
News & Wor 1 d Report. Throughout the 1970s, sources of information 
continually supported various means of protectionism. Government 
sources denied that price-induced controls debilitated the U.S. oil 
market. Businessmen with interests in the oil industry have 
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historically disliked competitive prices for petroleum as well as a 
policy of free market competition in energy. In fact, the petroleum 
industry has regulated the supply of oil and the market place since the 
early 1920 1 s. 
The oil crises (or more precisely the two oil crises of 1973-
74 and 1978-79 dramatically reshaped our foreign policy, 
particulary our view of the Third World. It touched every 
side of our domestic economy from, as Ronald Reagan puts it, 
11 Wall Street to Main Street11 ••• The American experience of 
the 1970s was profoundly reshaped by the two words 11 oi 1 
crises ... ~ 
Recommendations 
Because the media are entrusted with the responsibility of accurate 
reporting, investigating, and understanding of a major public policy 
issue, the presentation of coverage of the oil crises during the 
seventies by U.S. news magazines raised questions of accountability. 
The information disseminated is a small part of the vast assortment 
of ideas that the medium has to choose from, and so, the selection 
process must be given careful consideration. Historical perspective and 
economic principles are vital components for understanding a major 
public policy issue. The oil crises were reported as if the United 
States had no economic hi story though market so 1 uti ons have proven in 
the eighties to be the most viable solution to our nation•s energy 
problems. These are areas of research that should be included in any 
study addressing a major public policy issue. S i nee the petro 1 eum 
market has experienced another economic downturn in the eighties and 
other studies may follow this one, it is proposed that the political 
economy of the petroleum market based on economic principles and 
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historical perspective be foremost in the research design rather than 
addressed as an underlying issue. 
Furthermore, future reporting of a major public policy issue should 
require in-depth research of underlying issues that contribute to the 
overall picture. Simply reporting the diverse range of subjects 
relative to a major public policy issue is inadequate if the link 
between historical and future policy issues is to be disclosed. 
Moreover, analytical rather than investigative journalism should be 
fundamental in reporting such complex issues. Reporting a major public 
policy issue of the magnitude of the oil crises requires that 
journalists are aware of the implications of their coverage. 
Comprehensive coverage of a major pub 1 i c po 1 icy issue by journa 1 i sts 
requires a knowledge of our political economy that exceeds 
expectations. Professionalism is based on confidence, thus, the media 
professions are charged with the responsibi 1 ity of imposing standards 
that are beyond scrutiny. 
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COOING SHEET 
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First Oil Crises: 
Second Oil Crises: 
Newsweek 
Time 
CODING SHEET 
1973-74 
1978-79 
U.S. News & World Report 
Subjects: 
Solutions (Non-market): 
Conservation: 
Called for/needed/advanced as solution 
Conservation measures as effective/successful 
Conservation measures as ineffective/unsuccessful 
Lowered thermostat settings 
Lowered highway speeds 
White House symbolic conservation measures 
Reduced electric lighting 
Daylight Savings Time 
Car Pooling 
Airline flight reductions 
Other measures discussed (fuel-efficient cars, closing 
schools in winter) 
Rationing: 
Overall portrayal as desirable/advanced as a solution 
Overall portrayal as undesirable 
---- Rationing is probable 
---- Ration, other 
Regulation: 
Price controls 
Solutions (Market): 
Deregulation, decontrol 
Taxes 
Price Mechanism 
Domestic Production 
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Solutions (Other) 
Causes: 
Divestiture of Oil Companies 
Countermeasures against OPEC by U.S. 
Oil Industry: 
Oil industry blamed (general) 
Holding back supplies/tankers offshore 
---- Excessive profits, price-gouging 
---- Hoax, conspiracy 
Government: 
OPEC: 
Allocation system blamed 
Regulation, price controls 
Government blamed (general) 
Denial that government should be blamed 
OPEC blamed 
Sources: 
Government: 
Federal, excluding Congress 
== Congress 
State & local 
Non-Government: 
Oil Industry (excluding service station operators) 
Non-oil industry/business 
OPEC 
"Man-in-the-street" 
Labor (auto, teamsters, miners) 
"Experts" (financial analysts, economists, energy 
experts) 
Other (consumer groups, foreign leaders, foreign 
countries, GALLUP, AP, academic institutions) 
Service station operators 
Unidentifiable (unattributed source) 
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TABLE III 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND SUBJECTS 
DISCUSSED AS SOLUTIONS DURING THE 
Newsweek 
Time 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
.01 
.54 
.32 
FIRST OIL CRISIS 
SOLUTIONS 
Nonmarket 
( 1.00) 
.14 
{1.00) 
.54 
(. 96) 
.32 
TABLE IV 
Market 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1.00 
( .04) 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND SUBJECTS 
DISCUSSED AS SOLUTIONS DURING THE 
Newsweek 
Time 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
.33 
.48 
.18 
SECOND OIL CRISIS 
SOLUTIONS 
Nonmarket 
(. 65) 
.22 
(.70) 
.31 
(.55) 
.12 
Market 
.33 
(.35) 
.39 
(.30) 
.28 
(. 45) 
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0 
0 
.01 
.12 
.14 
.10 
Newsweek 
Time 
TABLE V 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND SUBJECTS 
DISCUSSED AS CAUSES OF THE OIL CRISIS 
DURING THE FIRST OIL CRISIS 
CAUSES 
G ovt. 0 ·1 I d 1 n ustry OPEC 
.17 0 .14 
{.33) (0) ( .67) 
.04 0 
.50 .67 .36 
(. 30) ( .20) (.50) 
.13 .09 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
.33 .33 
(.20) 
.50 
( .10) (.70) 
Newsweek 
Time 
.09 .04 
TABLE VI 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND SUBJECTS 
DISCUSSED AS CAUSES OF THE OIL CRISIS 
DURING THE SECOND OIL CRISIS 
CAUSES 
G t ov • o·1 I d t 1 n us ry OPEC 
.42 .20 .60 
(. 42) (.08) (.50) 
.19 .04 
• 50 .80 .30 
( .46) (. 31) ( .23) 
.22 .15 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
.08 0 
{.50) 
.10 
{0) (.50) 
.04 0 
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.09 
.04 
.30 
.22 
.11 
.04 
Newsweek 
Time 
U.S. News and 
World Report 
Newsweek 
Time 
U.S. News and 
World Report 
TABLE VII 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED DURING 
THE FIRST OIL CRISIS 
SOURCES 
G overnmen t N ongovernmen 
.20 .32 
(.23) (. 77) 
.07 
.33 .32 
(.33) ( .67) 
.11 
.47 .35 
( .39) (. 61) 
.15 
TABLE VIII 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED DURING 
THE SECOND OIL CRISIS 
SOURCES 
t 
.22 
.22 
.24 
G overnment N ongovernmen t 
.23 .35 
(.25) (.75) 
.08 .23 
.46 .50 
(.32) ( .68) 
.15 .33 
.31 .15 
(.50) (.50) 
.10 .10 
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TABLE IX 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND SOLUTIONS DISCUSSED DURING 
THE FIRST OIL CRISIS AND THE SECOND OIL CRISIS 
Newsweek 
Time 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
FIRST OIL CRISIS 
Nonmarket Market 
.14 0 
(. 37) (0) 
.08 
.54 0 
(. 63) (O) 
.31 
.32 1.00 
(. 66) (.03) 
.19 
SECOND OIL CRISIS 
Nonmarket Market 
.33 .33 
(. 41) ( .22) 
0 .09 .05 
.48 .39 
( .26) ( .11) 
0 .13 .06 
.18 .28 
(.17) ( .14) 
.01 .05 .04 
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Newsweek 
Time 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
.17 
.50 
.33 
TABLE X 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND CAUSES DISCUSSED DURING 
THE FIRST OIL CRISIS AND THE SECOND OIL CRISIS 
FIRST 0 I L C-RISIS SECOND OIL CRISIS 
Govt 
--- .- - -
Oil Ind. OPEC Govt. Oil Ind. 
0 .14 .42 .20 
{ .07) {0) (.13) (.33) ( .07) 
.02 0 .04 .10 .02 
.• 67 .36 .50 .80 
(~13) ( .09) ( .22) (. 26) . ( .17) 
.06 .04 .10 .12 .08 
.33 .50 .08 0 
(.17) (. 08) (.58) ( .08) (0) 
.04 .02 .14 .02 0 
----
OPEC 
.60 
(. 40) 
.30 
(.13) 
.10 
( .08) 
.12 
.06 
.02 
U'1 
o-. 
Newsweek 
Time 
TABLE XI 
RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NEWS MAGAZINES AND SOURCES 
OF INFORMATION DURING THE FIRST OIL CRISIS 
AND THE SECOND OIL CRISIS 
FIRST OIL CRISIS SECOND OIL CRISIS 
Nonmarket Market Nonmarket Market 
.20 .32 .23 .35 
(.12) ( .40) (.12) (.36) 
.04 .12 .04 
.33 .32 .46 .50 
(.15) (. 29) (.18) (.38) 
.06 .12 .07 
U.S. News & 
World Report 
.47 
(. 27) 
.35 
(. 42) 
.31 .15 
(.15) ( .15) 
.08 .13 .05 
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.15 
.05 
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